Labour and democracy in the Maghreb : the Moroccan and Tunisian trade unions in the 2011 Arab Uprisings by Feltrin, Lorenzo
  
 
 
 
warwick.ac.uk/lib-publications 
 
 
 
 
 
Manuscript version: Author’s Accepted Manuscript 
The version presented in WRAP is the author’s accepted manuscript and may differ from the 
published version or Version of Record. 
 
Persistent WRAP URL: 
http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/119822                            
 
How to cite: 
Please refer to published version for the most recent bibliographic citation information.  
If a published version is known of, the repository item page linked to above, will contain 
details on accessing it. 
 
Copyright and reuse: 
The Warwick Research Archive Portal (WRAP) makes this work by researchers of the 
University of Warwick available open access under the following conditions.  
 
Copyright © and all moral rights to the version of the paper presented here belong to the 
individual author(s) and/or other copyright owners. To the extent reasonable and 
practicable the material made available in WRAP has been checked for eligibility before 
being made available. 
 
Copies of full items can be used for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit 
purposes without prior permission or charge. Provided that the authors, title and full 
bibliographic details are credited, a hyperlink and/or URL is given for the original metadata 
page and the content is not changed in any way. 
 
Publisher’s statement: 
Please refer to the repository item page, publisher’s statement section, for further 
information. 
 
For more information, please contact the WRAP Team at: wrap@warwick.ac.uk. 
 
	   1 
Labour and democracy in the Maghreb: The Moroccan 
and Tunisian trade unions in the 2011 Arab Uprisings  
 
Lorenzo Feltrin, University of Warwick, UK  
 
Abstract  
This article focuses on the part played by Moroccan and Tunisian labour in the 2011 
Arab Uprisings and their outcomes, aiming to add fresh evidence to the long-standing 
debate over the place of social classes in democratisation processes. In Morocco, most 
labour confederations supported a new constitution that did not alter the undemocratic 
nature of the political system. In Tunisia, instead, rank-and-file trade unionists 
successfully rallied the single labour confederation in support of the popular 
mobilisations, eventually contributing to democratisation. The most important facilitating 
factor for these divergent processes and outcomes was the different level of working- 
class power existing in the two countries. On the eve of the Uprisings, working-class 
power was higher in Tunisia than in Morocco and this enabled Tunisian workers to 
mobilise more effectively. Democratisation in Tunisia, however, has so far failed to 
address the demands for social justice that were at the core of the Uprisings. 
 
Introduction  
This research examines the roles played by Moroccan and Tunisian labour in the 2011 
Arab Uprisings and their aftermath, with the aim of contributing fresh evidence to the 
long-standing debate over the place of social classes in democratisation processes. 
Morocco and Tunisia are particularly fit for comparison because they are relatively 
similar cases, despite the fact that the first is a monarchy and the second a republic. In 
fact, they are both Maghribi countries and share the legacies of the French protectorate 
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and parallel paths of neoliberal structural adjustment. Both were recently invested by a 
wave of mobilisations for democracy and social justice in which the trade unions were 
involved. However, in Morocco, against the background of the campaign of the 
Mouvement 20 Février (M20Fev) for democracy and social justice, most labour 
confederations supported a new constitution that did not alter the undemocratic nature of 
the political system. In Tunisia, instead, politicised union militants successfully 
challenged the policy of compromise with the regime held by the top leadership of the 
single labour confederation Union Générale Tunisienne du Travail (UGTT), contributing 
to the eventual democratisation of the country. Democratisation in Tunisia, however, has 
so far failed to address the demands for social justice that were at the core of the 
Uprisings.  
The central argument is that the most important facilitating factor for these different roles 
of the trade unions in democratic struggles and their outcomes was the different level of 
working-class power existing in the two countries. The comparison of working-class 
power in Morocco and Tunisia shows that, on the eve of the Uprisings, working-class 
power was higher in Tunisia than in Morocco and that this enabled Tunisian workers to 
mobilise more effectively for democratisation. These findings support the body of 
literature claiming that working-class power, other things being equal, tends to contribute 
to democratisation, in the Middle East as elsewhere. Therefore, the Arab Uprisings’ 
‘modest harvest’ in terms of democratisation can also be seen as a consequence of, 
among other factors, the high labour-repressiveness of the region.  
The article is based on fieldwork including 96 semi-structured interviews, a digitalised 
press archive of over 2,000 items, and the analysis of labour legislation, socioeconomic 
statistics and other documents produced by the state and the trade unions. The author 
spent 18 months in the researched countries. The archival research took place in the 
documental centres of Rabat and Tunis. In Tunisia, the interviews were conducted in 
Greater Tunis, Kasserine, Gafsa, Sfax and Sidi Bouzid as well as in smaller towns in the 
vicinities of these cities. In Morocco, the interviews were carried out in Rabat, 
Casablanca, Tangiers, Marrakesh, Khouribga, Agadir and Fez. Most interviewees were 
rank-and-file and mid-level trade unionists from a wide range of employment sectors. 
	   3 
However, workers with no union responsibilities, top-level union leaders, social 
movement and party activists, civil servants, experts and members of the unemployed 
associations were also interviewed. Moving outside of the capital cities and talking with 
activists and workers located in different positions in respect to the labour confederations 
allowed the author to gain a more multi-faceted and articulated grasp of Morocco and 
Tunisia’s working-class mobilisations and trade unionism.  
The first section discusses labour in democratisation processes with a specific focus on 
the Arab Uprisings; it then spells out the indicators of working-class power used for this 
research. The second section provides a brief account of the historical construction of 
working-class power in Morocco and Tunisia and a description of the respective balances 
of class power on the eve of the Uprisings. Against this background, the last section tells 
how the relevant actors behaved during the Uprisings and in their aftermath, tracing the 
developments that resulted in the outcomes under investigation.  
 
Measuring class power: The working class in the 2011 Arab Uprisings  
Class power and democracy  
In the historical debate over social classes and democratisation, some authors argued that 
the bourgeoisie (e.g. Moore, 1966) or the middle class (e.g. Lipset, 1960) have a 
privileged role, while others claimed that labour has historically been the most consistent 
pro-democracy collective actor because democracy is in the interest of the workers (e.g. 
Esping-Andersen, 1985; Rueschemeyer et al., 1992; Therborn, 1977). In the latter view, 
working-class power is an important positive factor in democratisation processes.  
Academic work on labour in the 2011 Arab Uprisings has also maintained that labour 
was a significant pro-democracy actor. Much research going in this direction deals with 
Egypt (Alexander and Bassiouny, 2014; Beinin, 2012; De Smet, 2012; El-Mahdi, 2011; 
Totonchi, 2011), which historically has been the Arab country attracting the greatest 
attention from labour scholars. More recently, Tunisian labour similarly came under the 
spotlight. This was due to the decisive role of rank-and-file trade unionists in the 
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Uprising, which became clear as the UGTT turned into a central broker of the political 
negotiations that followed Ben Ali’s downfall (Mizouni, 2012; Netterstrøm, 2016; Omri, 
2017; Wilder, 2015; Yousfi, 2015).1 Tunisia is the only country concerned in the 
Uprisings that has democratised, and organised labour participated directly in this 
outcome. In a comparative perspective, both Beinin (2016) and Allinson (2015) imply 
that the fact that Tunisia had the strongest working class in the Arab world contributed to 
its democratisation. In a similar vein, Del Panta (2017) holds that authoritarian resilience 
in Algeria is due, among other things, to labour weakness there.  
However, the claim that Tunisia was the Arab country in which working-class power was 
highest before the Uprisings is not uncontroversial. In fact, in an important pre-Uprisings 
study on 13 Arab countries, Cammett and Posusney suggested that the country where 
labour had most leverage was Morocco:  
 
General political liberalization should enhance union freedoms, and the struggle for 
organizing rights is intrinsically part of democratization movements. Variation in the 
authoritarian structures of Middle Eastern countries, and related differences in union–
state relations, suggests arenas where progress can be expected, at least in the short 
term. Thanks to both partisan competition and competitive unionism, Morocco is 
already furthest along in freedom of association and appears to provide the best 
environment for additional advancement. ... Thus, this paper lends further support to the 
comparative finding that single party states appear to have the most resilient form of 
authoritarianism and suggests the intriguing possibility that some of the historically 
conservative monarchies of the region may ultimately prove to be the most progressive 
on labor rights. (Cammett and Posusney, 2010: 276)  
 
The validity of this claim cannot be assessed against the existing literature. Recently 
published academic research on Moroccan labour is very scant and almost non-existent in 
the English literature. Zemni et al. (2012) compared workers’ struggles in the 2011 Arab 
Uprisings of Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia, but the article – while valuable – contains no 
substantial analysis of Moroccan trade unionism. Buehler (2015) produced an article 
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showing how, in 2011, the Moroccan unions gained socioeconomic concessions thanks to 
the context of political instability. But the second most recent English-language work on 
Moroccan unions is a short MERIP report dating from 30 years before (Clement and 
Paul, 1984). At the time of writing the present article, there is no published academic 
work, in any language, providing an in-depth comparison of working-class power in 
Morocco and Tunisia. The article thus contributes to filling this gap in the literature.  
According to Cammett and Posusney: ‘Moroccan exceptionalism reflects that country’s 
long history of competitive unionism’ (Cammett and Posusney, 2010: 271). But this 
emphasis on the institutional arrangement of competitive unionism might be partially 
misleading. The right to form alternative trade unions is certainly an asset for workers 
(and it falls under the indicator of civil and political rights below), but union 
fragmentation is often considered as a liability (e.g. Korpi and Shalev, 1979). Thus, 
whether the abundance of labour confederations is positive or negative for workers 
should be established through a historical analysis of the processes through which they 
came into being, depending on the relative weight of mobilisation from below versus 
divide-and-conquer tactics from above. Therefore, competitive unionism is not the best 
single indicator for measuring working-class power and a multidimensional approach is 
preferable.  
Erik Olin Wright defines class power in these terms: ‘In the context of class analysis, 
power can be thought of as the capacity of individuals and organizations to realize their 
class interests’ (Wright, 2000: 962). He then distinguishes between working-class 
‘structural power’ – depending on workers’ position in the economic system – and 
‘associational power’ – depending on the strength of labour organisations. This 
distinction is particularly useful because structural power, unlike most indicators on 
associational power, provides information on the potential for workers’ mobilisation both 
within and without the trade unions and, as we will see, the Uprisings featured both kinds 
of mobilisation.  
For analytical purposes, the lower layers of the waged middle class are included here 
within the working class, given the convergence of interests and organisations of the two 
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categories. Unwaged workers are also included, as the author shares the perspective 
according to which, especially in the global South, it is misleading to consider as 
working-class members waged employees only (see Van Der Linden, 2014).  
Working-class power is seen here as arising both from ‘economic’ factors (e.g. sectors of 
employment or characteristics of the labour market) and ‘political’ factors (e.g. civil and 
political rights or collective bargaining institutions). However, this relation should not be 
seen in deterministic terms. Working-class power, even in its most structural elements 
like the sectorial location of the workers, is historically constructed through successive 
rounds of social struggles and can change through further conflicts. A given balance of 
class power indicates a certain distribution of resources between classes, pointing to a 
range of likelier outcomes. But actual outcomes and the way in which they occur can in 
no way be pre-determined in the face of the agency of social actors that mobilise class 
power through contingent strategies. 
 
Indicators of working-class power (see Table 1)  
To assess working-class structural power in Morocco and Tunisia, the following 
indicators are singled out as the most informative, given the availability of data and the 
characteristics of the cases:  
1. Sectorial location refers to the distribution of employment in economic sectors that 
tend to provide, other things being equal, more mobilising potential and more 
advantageous conditions to the workers (e.g. manufacturing versus agriculture).  
2. Job security is heuristically measured through the share of workers having open-ended 
contracts and social security benefits. In both countries, open-ended contracts 
grant a series of legal protections against layoffs. The preciseness of this indicator 
is affected by the impossibility to measure the extent of actual implementation of 
the labour legislation. However, as labour law violations were similar or worse in 
Morocco relative to Tunisia (see below), this difficulty does not invalidate the 
indicator.   
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3. The Human Development Index provides information on how much workers – who 
constitute the majority of the population of Morocco and Tunisia – are wealthy, 
healthy and educated, and thus empowered to mobilise for their interests. 
Moreover, in the absence of complete and reliable data on wages, the combination 
of GNI per capita and inequality indexes outlines a picture of the national 
distribution of income to the workers. This is also consistent with the theoretical 
choice of including unwaged workers in the working class.   
4. The social wage refers to the level of public expenditure for welfare services and it 
indicates the extent to which workers are independent of the market for their 
education, health and social security, and of charity for poverty relief. This partial 
decommodification, in turn, reinforces their bargaining power.   
Some apparently obvious indicators, like wage levels and unemployment rates, do not 
appear in the list. The problem with wages is the absence, at time of writing, of publicly 
available complete data for the Moroccan private sector. Comparing the legal minimum 
wage of the two countries presupposes that it is equally applied in both, which is very far 
from warranted for all legal indicators. Unemployment rates are normally used as an 
indicator for the tightness or looseness of national labour markets, which in turn affects 
workers’ bargaining power. Official unemployment rates, however, are not very 
meaningful in global South countries that do not provide unemployment subsidies. In 
fact, workers are thus forced to somehow work anyway, no matter the availability of 
‘decent’ employment. Unemployment rates in the global South are lower than in the 
West, but working-class structural power is not higher in the former. Morocco’s official 
unemployment rate in 2010 was 9%, four percentage points lower than Tunisia’s 13% 
(ILOSTAT), which even used a more restrictive definition of unemployment. However, 
these numbers have a very limited meaning, knowing that in the same year 23.5% of the 
Moroccan employed population fell within the ‘unpaid employed’ category (HCP, 2011). 
Surely, both Moroccan and Tunisian workers face extremely loose labour markets, 
marred by acute underemployment and precarity.  
To assess associational power, the following indicators are used:  
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1. Trade union density is the most common indicator of union power. Other things being 
equal, unions with more members can stage larger and more effective mobilisations. The 
preciseness of this indicator is affected by the fact that unions can sometimes mobilise 
non-members too. However, as shown below, it is in Tunisia (where union density is 
higher) that trade unionists contributed more successfully to mobilise the non-unionised.  
2. Collective bargaining coverage reflects the unions’ capacity to improve workers’ 
wages and conditions through collective agreements, and it is, therefore, another classic 
indicator of union power. 
3. Civil and political rights define the range of contentious action to which workers and 
their organisations can recur without facing state repression and the extent to which 
workers can elect representatives of their choosing in state institutions. 
4. Internal democracy is not a direct indicator of union power, but it refers to the extent 
to which union power is the power of the workers, rather than just power over the 
workers (see Hyman, 1975). This aspect is of particular importance in authoritarian 
countries, where unions can be little more than appendages of the regime. Limitations of 
internal democracy can appear both as bureaucratic practices restraining rank-and-file 
democracy through formal rules (see Camfield, 2013) and as patrimonial practices 
through which the union leaders maintain undemocratic control by violating formal rules.  
The reader will notice the absence of labour parties, tripartite institutions and competitive 
unionism. In fact, these elements cannot be considered as straightforward indicators of 
working-class associational power, because they can act as vehicles of both 
empowerment and co-optation/weakening depending on the context. They will be 
discussed in the empirical section, but they cannot be synthesised as univocal indicators.  
Also missing is the breadth of union freedoms in the two countries before 2011 because it 
is difficult to assess. Stallings (2010) used an index composed of legal provisions and 
reports on labour law violations by the International Trade Union Confederation, the US 
State Department and the ILO. The resulting index states that de facto union freedoms 
were higher in Morocco than in Tunisia. However, evidence from the author’s interviews 
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and archival research points towards the opposite direction. For example, the author 
witnessed three cases (Doha, Maghreb Steel, Med Paper) in which hundreds of striking 
Moroccan workers were fired for defending their union representatives against illegal 
layoffs. While anti-union discrimination in the Tunisian private sector is a very 
widespread phenomenon, to the author’s knowledge violations on this scale are unseen 
there. In any case, both reports by international agencies and qualitative fieldwork are 
anecdotal evidence for a quantitative phenomenon and cannot be seen as conclusive. 
Despite the gaps in the data, the overall divergence between Morocco and Tunisia on the 
above indicators is significant and coherent enough to allow for solid conclusions on their 
different balances of class power before the Uprisings.  
Table 1 – Indicators of working-class power 
Working-class structural power Working-class associational power 
Sectorial location Trade union density 
Job security Collective bargaining coverage 
Human Development Index Civil and political rights 
The social wage Internal democracy 
 
 
Building class power: The historical construction of the balance of class power  
Social struggles and political regimes  
Moroccan and Tunisian trade unionism first appeared under the French protectorate 
through the local sections of the French Confédération Générale du Travail (CGT) 
(Ayache, 1982–1993; Ben Hamida, 2003). In 1944, the Tunisian CGT cadre Farhat 
Hached led a split that resulted in the founding of the UGTT two years later. Since its 
beginnings, the UGTT participated in the National Movement in alliance with the 
nationalist Neo-Destour Party. But, on 5 December 1952, Farhat Hached was 
assassinated in Tunis by the French secret services. The Moroccan CGT leaders thus 
called for a demonstration of solidarity with Tunisia in Casablanca, which was repressed 
in blood by the French authorities. These dramatic events established Moroccan labour as 
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one of the three poles of the National Movement, along with the nationalist Istiqlal Party 
and the armed resistance. But only on 20 March 1955 did the Moroccan labour leaders 
found the Union Marocaine du Travail (UMT) as an independent Moroccan 
confederation. After Morocco and Tunisia achieved Independence in 1956, in the former 
hereditary rule persisted while in the latter it was abolished. The labour movements of 
both countries had participated in the National Liberation struggle, but in Tunisia this 
happened through a national confederation from an earlier stage and thus the role of 
labour was more central.  
In Morocco, the regime that emerged after Independence was built on a conservative 
social basis led by rural landowners. In 1961, the new king Hassan II took direct control 
of the executive and reversed the Istiqlal’s initial redistributive and industrialising 
policies, as he feared that an overhaul of agriculture would undermine his rural power 
base (Leveau, 1985 [1976]). The splits within the National Movement after its failure to 
gain control of the state led to the early beginnings of competitive unionism in Morocco, 
with the foundation of the Istiqlal-linked Union Générale des Travailleurs du Maroc 
(UGTM) (see Menouni, 1979). Meanwhile, since the defeats of the early 1960s, the UMT 
leadership grew increasingly compromising with the Palace.  
In Tunisia, on the other hand, the new regime was based on a populist social basis, which 
resulted in a programme of import-substitution industrialisation and a series of material 
concessions to the working class that were never to be seen in Morocco (Ben Romdhane, 
2011). There was a deep overlapping of memberships in the single party, the single trade 
union and the state; a triangular state–party–union architecture typical of populist 
corporatist regimes. But the UGTT – while allied to the regime – preserved a certain 
degree of autonomy, the scope of which varied historically depending on the political 
conjuncture (see Hamzaoui, 2013).  
In both countries, the 1970s were characterised by the leftwards radicalisation of the 
student movement and by a large strike wave (Belaïd, 1989). However, in Morocco, the 
severity of state repression prevented the New Left originating from the universities to 
build an important presence in the labour unions. Meanwhile, faced with the UMT’s 
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immobilism and lack of internal democracy, the socialist party Union Socialiste des 
Forces Populaires (USFP)2 created its own union, the Confédération Démocratique du 
Travail (CDT), on 25–26 November 1978 (Benhlal, 1985).  
In Tunisia, conversely, the New Left ex-students joined the workforce and the UGTT at 
once. While workers grew restive, the radicals demanded internal democracy and 
challenged the submission of the union to the ruling Destourian Party (see Bellin, 2002). 
These mobilisations culminated in the 26 January 1978 UGTT general strike, that was 
violently crushed by the security forces. The regime jailed and tried tens of union cadres, 
including the quasi-totality of the UGTT National Executive Committee (NEC). But, 
despite the defeat, these struggles dismantled the triangular state–party–union 
architecture as it used to be, an achievement with far-reaching, long-term consequences 
that did not obtain in the other Arab populist countries. On the one hand, a solid leftist 
opposition had emerged within the confederation. On the other hand, after this bitter 
conflict, the top union leadership ceased to be a reliable ally of the regime.  
During the 1980s, the Moroccan and Tunisian states entered a fiscal crisis that pushed 
them to negotiate stabilisation plans with the IMF and enter neoliberal structural 
adjustment. Severe protests and crackdowns marked their transition to neoliberalism. In 
Morocco, these included the repression of the 20 June 1981 general strike called by the 
CDT, of the January 1984 Bread Riots, and of the 14 December 1990 general strike 
called by the CDT and the UGTM. In Tunisia, the Bread Riots of 1983–1984 were 
quashed in blood and throughout 1985 the regime escalated its crackdown on the UGTT.  
After structural adjustment, Morocco partially opened its political system while in 
Tunisia authoritarianism remained steadfast. In the mid-1990s, Hassan II started 
negotiating with the opposition parties to prepare a smooth transmission of the throne to 
his son Mohammed VI. The CDT and the UGTM toed the line of their parties and, since 
1994, took part in a series of negotiations aiming to institutionalise a consultative social 
dialogue (Catusse, 1998). In 1998, the USFP was thus allowed to lead the government. 
The socialists hoped to democratise the country and improve social justice, but these 
goals remained largely unmet. Because of this, in the 2000s, the CDT distanced itself 
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from the USFP and entered a phase of splits and decline. From these splits, the USFP-
linked Fédération Démocratique du Travail (FDT) emerged, but the electoral weight and 
political significance of the USFP kept falling.  
In Tunisia, between 1985 and 1988, the regime survived on sheer labour repression. 
However, the continuing rise of the Islamists on the one hand and persistent wildcat 
strikes on the other made this arrangement untenable (Alexander, 1996). Ben Ali, who 
had taken power on 7 November 1987, needed a social basis to contain the Islamists and 
the easiest solution was reconstituting the corporatist alliance with the UGTT in a neo- 
liberal ‘post-populist’ form. Material concessions to the workers were partially 
retrenched, which was ‘compensated’ by a potentiated network of patron–client 
corrupting practices penetrating the union (Feltrin, forthcoming).  
Morocco promulgated its first Labour Code in 2003. It was apparently a bargain in which 
the unions accepted the flexibilisation of the formal labour market in exchange for the 
protection of union freedoms and other concessions. However, my interviewees were 
adamant in declaring that no real general improvement of union freedoms took place, 
which seems confirmed by persisting very low union density in the private sector. In the 
meantime, during the 1990s, New Left militants released from prison had built a radical 
opposition within the UMT, especially in the agricultural federation, the teaching 
federation, the local administrations federation and the Rabat regional union (Feltrin, 
forthcoming). The UMT left would attempt to use its power bases within the union to 
rally the labour movement in support of the 2011 mobilisations, but its efforts were 
unable to change substantially the line of the confederations.  
In Tunisia, Secretary General (SG) Ismail Sahbani led the UGTT into acceptance of 
neoliberal reforms and political support for Ben Ali. However, Sahbani’s association to 
the policies of the regime, coupled with escalating internal authoritarianism and 
corruption, undermined his grip on the organisation. In September 2000, he was replaced 
by Abdessalem Jerad. As detailed below, the late 2000s were characterised by an 
increasingly bitter internal battle between the supporters and the opponents of Jerad’s 
policy of compromise with the regime. The UGTT internal opposition would become an 
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important element in the making of the 2011 Tunisian Uprising.  
In sum, the divergent outcomes of historical social struggles in Morocco and Tunisia led 
to a different balance of class power in the two countries on the eve of the Uprisings. In 
the aftermath of National Liberation, Moroccan labour was marginalised by the ruling 
social coalition and it was unable to decisively influence the policies of the regime. The 
UMT’s declining power encouraged its leadership to increasingly compromise with the 
Palace despite the lack of concessions, and to take a conservative position when the 
1970s upsurge of social unrest came. The neoliberal turn saw the further weakening and 
fragmentation of Moroccan trade unionism, a crisis widely recognised in public debates.  
In Tunisia, the central role played by the UGTT in the National Movement allowed it to 
gain a strong foothold in the social coalition underlying the new regime, and to influence 
its initial policies to a large extent. This resulted in a populist social pact in which the 
working class gained significant material concessions but came at the cost of the partial 
subordination of the confederation to the regime. Despite this, when neoliberal 
restructuring started to take root in the 1970s, workers’ mobilisations were able to push 
the UGTT leadership to acts of radical opposition. While these attempts ended in defeat, 
they formed cracks in the triangular state–party–union architecture of populist 
corporatism and built a relatively strong militant power base within the UGTT. 
  
A different balance of class power  
This section provides further evidence for the thesis that, on the eve of the 2011 
Uprisings, working-class power was higher in Tunisia than in Morocco. Some of the 
figures in Tables 2 and 3, while coming from authoritative sources, are unlikely to be 
exact. But the scale and the coherence of the differences between the indicators for the 
two countries allow drawing safe conclusions.  
The long-standing results of Hassan II’s basic continuity with the colonial policy of 
primary product export – as a result of his political wariness of industrialisation – are still 
evident. In 2010, Morocco’s agricultural sector employed 36.3% of the workforce, while 
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in Tunisia it employed only 15.1% (ILOSTAT). This is an important factor in placing a 
higher share of Moroccan workers in unwaged and/or informal jobs, limiting the potential 
recruitment pool of the trade unions. Morocco’s small public sector is also a liability to 
working-class power since violations of the labour law and anti-union behaviours are 
much more common in the private sector. Finally, Tunisia has a higher proportion of 
workers in industry and in large enterprises, where organising potential is more elevated.  
Table 2 – Working-class structural power 
When possible, the author selected data for the years immediately preceding the 2011 Uprisings. 
 Morocco Tunisia 
Sectorial location – + 
Waged employment in total 
employment 
44.2% (2010)1 68.3% (2010)1  
Formal employment in total 
employment 
47.1% (2000-08)2 64.3% (2000-08)2 
Public sector employment in 
total employment 
8.5% (2010)3 22% (2010)4 
Industrial employment in 
total employment 
20% (2010)1 29.4% (2010)1 
Manufacturing employment 
in total employment 
11% (2011)1 18.3% (2010)1 
Employment in 100+ firms 
in total employment 
17% (2015)5 40% (2015)5 
Job security – + 
Workers with open-ended 
contracts in total 
employment 
11% (2010)3 42% (2011)6 
Social security coverage 30% (2008)7 78.9% (2010)8 
Human Development Index – + 
Position in HDI ranking 114 (2010)2 81 (2010)2 
GNI per capita (PPP 2008 $) 4,628 (2010)2 7,979 (2010)2 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 ILOSTAT 
2 UN-HDI 
3 HCP 2011 
4 Calculated by the author based on IMF 2014 and INS 2011 
5 European Commission 2015 
6 INS 2013 
7 CNSS Morocco 2009 
8 Ministry of Social Affairs Tunisia 2012 
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Income Gini Coefficient 40.7 (2006)9  35.8 (2010)9  
Coefficient of human 
inequality 
28.5 (2014)2 21.4 (2014)2 
Population in 
multidimensional poverty 
28.5% (2000-08)2 2.8% (2000-08)2 
Adult literacy rate 56.4% (2005-08)2 78% (2005-08)2 
Mean years of schooling 4.4 (2010)2 6.5 (2010)2 
Life expectancy at birth 71.8 (2010)2 74.3 (2010)2 
Infant mortality (per 1,000 live 
births) 
32 (2008)2 18 (2008)2 
The social wage – + 
Public expenditure on social 
benefits (% of GDP) 
4.3% (2011)10 7.7% (2011)10  
Public expenditure on 
education (% of GDP) 
5.7% (2000-07)2 7.2% (2000-07)2 
Public expenditure on health 
(% of GDP) 
1.7% (2000-07)2 3% (2000-07)2 
Overall working-class 
structural power 
– + 
 
With regard to job security, Tunisia has larger shares of workers under formal open-
ended contracts and enjoying social security.  
Despite the Moroccan regime’s recent efforts to promote economic growth and social 
indicators – which resulted in some improvements and much international praise – the 
fact remains that Morocco is still the poorest country in North Africa and the lowest- 
ranking on human development. In 2010, Tunisia’s GNI per capita was 172.5% that of 
Morocco. At the same time, Tunisia had lower Gini and Human Inequality Coefficients, 
which means that Tunisian workers (in the author’s broad definition) were less deprived 
than Moroccan ones. These different performances on human development are not only 
due to Tunisia’s historically higher economic growth but also to its larger welfare spend- 
ing. Despite the slowdown in welfare expansion, in the neoliberal period Tunisia was the 
highest social spender in the region (El-Said and Harrigan, 2014: 113).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 World DataBank	  
10 IMF Government Finance Statistics 
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This is another confirmation of the old social sciences discovery that revolt is not 
explained by absolute deprivation. What seems most significant in Tunisia is the wide- 
spread perception of the neoliberal erosion of the former populist social pact. In 
Morocco, strictly speaking, there never was a populist social pact,3 which probably 
lowered the expectations of many Moroccans. Myriam Catusse observes that: ‘Contrary 
to Tunisia or Algeria, the Moroccan welfare state has never lived its golden age. ... 
Therefore, the problem of “disengagement”, or of the privatisation of social protections, 
did not represent a radical break’4 (Catusse, 2010: 189). 
Table 3 – Working-class associational power 
 Morocco Tunisia 
Trade union density in 
waged employment 
6% (2015)11  23% (2010)12 
Trade union density in 
total employment 
3.2% (2015)11  15.8% (2010)12  
Collective bargaining 
coverage 
5-10% (2015)5 90% (2015 and before)5 
Civil liberties rating (1 best, 
7 worst) 
4 (2010)13 5 (2010)13  
Political rights rating (1 
best, 7 worst) 
5 (2010)13  7 (2010)13  
Internal democracy Low Medium 
Overall working-class 
associational power 
– + 
 
Morocco, before the 2011 Uprisings, featured a higher degree of civil and political rights 
than Tunisia. However, despite these freedoms, Moroccan unions remained very weak, as 
the other indicators of associational power show. In Tunisia, the tension between 
relatively high working-class power and very low civil and political rights probably con- 
tributes to explaining the sudden and insurrectional trajectory of the country’s 
democratisation.  
In Morocco, the relatively large scope of action for opposition parties allowed for the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 HCP 2016 
12 Calculated by the author based on UGTT and INS 2011 
13 Freedom House 
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existence of party-mediation between most trade unions and the state. At the same time, 
the Moroccan state’s mode of union incorporation through social dialogue touched a 
broader range of policies than Tunisia’s narrow incorporation via triennial national-
sectorial wage bargaining. Moreover, Moroccans enjoyed the right to form new unions, 
while in Tunisia attempts to create alternative confederations were repressed (except in 
times of crisis between the UGTT and the Destourian Party). But, so far, party-mediation, 
social dialogue and competitive unionism have not enabled the Moroccan unions to attain 
significant power and were more often vectors of partial co-optation and weakening, as 
the CDT’s history shows.  
By the 2000s, there were about 20 labour confederations in Morocco. The creation of 
new trade unions was encouraged by the fact that a share of parliamentary seats in the 
higher chamber is reserved for labour representatives based on the results of professional 
elections. Each political party thus attempts to create its own union-wing to maximise its 
parliamentary seats. Four confederations gained the ‘most representative’ status in the 
2009 professional elections: the UMT, the CDT, the FDT and the UGTM (in decreasing 
order). However, 65% of the elected private sector workplace representatives had no 
union affiliation. Low union density means that even the largest confederations directly 
represent an extremely limited fraction of the working class. In this context, the 
proliferation of trade unions – with little difference between them except for their party 
allegiance – is hardly a blessing for Moroccan workers because each confederation 
wields meagre power and coordination becomes costlier.  
Union density in Tunisia was probably almost four times as high as in Morocco in 2010 
and has increased after the Uprising. In 2010, an ILO report estimated union density in 
the Tunisian private sector at 27% (ILO, 2010). This is an exaggeration, and the 10–15% 
estimated by the European Commission (2015) seems more accurate. But the latter figure 
is still higher than Morocco’s overall union density of 6%, which includes the more 
unionised public sector. Moroccan unions lament widespread, systematic and severe anti-
union behaviours in the private sector, despite the Labour Code.  
In Tunisia, since the 1970s, national and national-sectorial collective bargaining also 
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applies to non-unionised workers, which results in a collective bargaining coverage of 
about 90%. In 2010, Morocco only had one national-sectorial collective agreement (for 
bank employees), one multi-employer local agreement (for truck drivers working with the 
Casablanca Port) and 10 firm-level collective agreements (Agueniou, 2010).  
Until the Uprisings, union democracy in Tunisia was marred by the regime’s attempts to 
impose a pliant leadership. But the struggles of the 1970s made unilateral state control 
over the UGTT untenable. This resulted in a compromise in which the union leadership 
had to be acceptable both to the regime and most of the union base. Up to the 2000s, the 
regime kept intervening effectively and in manifold ways in internal union life (Feltrin, 
forthcoming). However, basic internal regulations – like the periodic election of the union 
leaders through congresses – were respected.  
In Morocco, the unions’ internal democracy was only indirectly constrained by the 
regime through (decreasing) limits on the space for political opposition and (enduring) 
tolerance for union repression in the private sector. Because of low union density, 
legitimation and funding for the unions come more from the state than from their 
members. It is estimated that only 10–15% of the Moroccan unions’ budget comes from 
membership fees (Trari, 2017).5 This imbalance allowed for severe disregard for internal 
regulations. Between 1995 and 2010, the UMT held no national congress at all. In the 
2000s, the SGs of the three historical confederations had been in charge for decades. 
Mahjoub Benseddik remained UMT SG from the union’s foundation in 1955 until his 
death in 2010 (55 years). Abderrazak Afilal led the UGTM from 1962 to 2006. Noubir 
Amaoui, elected SG at the CDT First Congress in 1978, still heads the union today.  
The analysis of these multiple indicators thus shows that overall working-class power, in 
both its structural and associational dimensions, was higher in Tunisia than in Morocco 
on the eve of the 2011 Arab Uprisings. 
 
 
	   19 
Using class power: The trade unions in the 2011 Arab Uprisings and their aftermath  
Morocco: Trade union fragmentation and regime resilience  
This section provides a narrative of the 2011 mobilisations in Morocco. It will be shown 
that the Moroccan trade union leaderships faced relatively weaker pressures from below 
compared to Tunisia and that they had less power vis-a-vis the regime. Most of them, 
therefore, eventually supported the non-democratic constitutional reform led by the 
Palace and none took radical action (e.g. general strikes) against the regime. This is 
different from Tunisia, where, despite the compromising attitude of the top union 
leadership, the UGTT was pressured by the revolts of the precarious workers and by its 
own internal dissidents to call for the regional general strikes that were essential in the 
downfall of the regime.  
In the late 2000s, various social mobilisations emerged in Morocco, particularly over 
employment, the cost of living and access to resources (Bogaert, 2015). The most 
remarkable were the Bouarfa movement against rising water prices and the Sidi Ifni 
movement for employment. Local union activists participated in both cases. 
Graph 1 – Strike activity in Morocco and Tunisia 1994-2014 
The comparative value of this graph is limited by the fact the Moroccan Ministry of Employment does not 
record strikes in the public administration. 
 
 
 
Sources: ILO, Ministry of Employment Morocco, Ministry of Social Affairs Tunisia 
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In 2009, workdays lost because of strikes – which had remained low throughout the 
2000s – saw a sudden spike (see Figure 1), and strike activity remained relatively high in 
2010. The government, however, cancelled the autumn social dialogue negotiations, 
because the economic crisis discouraged concessions. On 3 March and 3 November 2010, 
the unions held national general strikes in the public sector demanding higher wages, 
which the government refused. In January and February 2011, strikes were declared by 
several groups of workers like miners, social security employees, dockers, tax collectors 
and teachers. Ministry of Justice employees had been holding weekly strikes for months. 
When the Tunisian Uprising erupted, Morocco was thus already in the midst of a wave of 
social mobilisations within and beyond the workplace. In 2011, strikes surged and several 
movements of precarious workers were mounted. The latter included out-sourced 
workers reclaiming direct hiring, informal street vendors requesting space for their 
business, or unemployed graduates demanding public sector jobs (Emperador, 2011). The 
M20Fev was only the most visible strand of this broader unrest. It was initially a coalition 
of leftist groups and independent activists, but they were soon joined by the Islamist 
organisation Al-Adl Wa Al-Ihssane. On 20 February 2011, the M20Fev staged its first 
national demonstration. Since then, it held periodic protests demanding democracy and 
social justice (see Bennani-Chraïbi and Jeghllaly, 2012; Desrues, 2013).  
The three largest confederations (UMT, CDT, FDT) initially endorsed the M20Fev. The 
UMT and the CDT were also part of the M20Fev National Support Committee. The 
fourth confederation, the Istiqlal-linked UGTM, refused its support since the beginning, 
because it had no interest in backing a movement that was embarrassing a government 
led by its party of affiliation.  
The regime attempted to defuse popular unrest with the mix of opening and repression 
that it had experimented with since the 1990s. A crucial element in this strategy was the 
separation between the ‘political’ M20Fev and the ‘apolitical’ protests for immediate 
socioeconomic needs. On 14 February 2011, the Istiqlali PM Abbas El-Fassi met the 
opposition parties and announced a series of socioeconomic concessions: the doubling of 
the budget for consumption subsidies, the hiring of unemployed graduates in the public 
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administration, and the reopening of social dialogue with the unions. On the same day, 
the Ministry of Justice employees were offered an agreement that promised to fulfil their 
demands. On 27 February 2011, the royal counsellor Mohamed Mouatassim received the 
SGs of the country’s five largest unions: the UMT, the CDT, the FDT, the UGTM and 
the UNTM.6 The exact content of the meeting is unknown, but Mouatassim announced 
Mohammed VI’s willingness to satisfy the demands of the unions.  
The new social dialogue started on 4 April 2011 with the participation of the UMT, the 
FDT, the UGTM, the UNTM and the main employers’ organisation. The CDT initially 
boycotted the negotiations, but it eventually joined after the first bargaining rounds. The 
negotiations ended on 26 April 2011 with a list of generous concessions. The most 
important were: all public administration wages were raised by 600 dirhams (US$77.6 at 
the time) per month; the share of public employees to be promoted went from 28% to 
33%; the minimum old-age pension increased from 600 dirhams to 1000 dirhams 
(US$129.4 at the time); and the national minimum wage increased by 15%. The unions 
had thus far been unable to win these concessions by their own strength, but regional 
instability and mounting social unrest pushed the regime to accommodate them.  
On 9 March 2011, Mohammed VI announced a constitutional reform that partially 
addressed the demands of the M20Fev. But the latter refused these proposals since it 
maintained that the new constitution had to be drafted by a democratically elected 
constitutional assembly and not by a committee appointed by the king. The USFP, 
however, agreed to engage in this political process, which distanced its associated union 
FDT from the M20Fev.  
The UMT left attempted to rally the whole confederation in support of the M20Fev. It did 
so most effectively in Rabat, where its control of the regional executive committee 
allowed it to make the union premises available to the M20Fev for assemblies, events and 
related activities. The Rabat UMT also created the network ‘Trade Unionists for the 
M20Fev’, attempting to link labour unrest with the movement for democracy. The 
network had, however, a relatively limited impact. The UMT NEC half-heartedly 
accepted these initiatives, but the rupture came in the run up to the referendum for the 
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approval of the new constitution, to be held on 1 July 2011. The M20Fev called for a 
boycott of the referendum, as the proposed text, despite its concessions, left crucial 
powers to the Palace. The UMT left demanded that the confederation keep neutral on the 
referendum but, on 21 June 2011, the NEC publicly endorsed a Yes vote.  
The CDT thus remained the only union siding with the M20Fev and boycotting the 
constitutional referendum. However, the CDT did not promote this position through 
radical action like regional or national general strikes. Most M20Fev militants 
interviewed for this research charged that the CDT’s support became timid because the 
confederation ‘sold out’ by participating in the social dialogue and accepting material 
concessions with the implicit condition of abandoning radical political opposition. 
Whatever the plausibility of these claims, the crucial fact is that the CDT alone did not 
have the power to call a successful general strike. In fact, the country’s second union had 
a self-declared membership of 61,500 (0.6% of the employed), hardly enough to change 
the political equilibrium.  
An interviewed M20Fev activist made the following comment: 
 
I don’t think the unions represent the workers here [in Morocco]. If we analyse things 
historically, the unions have had an important role in the past ... . But with time, their role 
has diminished gradually, and trade union density is lower than ever, 3% by now [3.2% of 
total employment]. ... So, if they can’t give concrete answers to the problems of the 
workers, how are they going to play a role in the movement or influence the general 
public opinion?7 (Fez, 17 March 2016) 
 
The new constitution passed with 98.5% approval, which set the stage for early elections 
on 25 November 2011. The Islamist PJD won a majority and was thus allowed to form a 
government. After the elections, the M20Fev began to gradually lose steam. As the 
mobilisations waned, the UMT NEC decided to regain control of the Rabat union 
buildings from the left. On 5 March 2012, the UMT Administrative Commission 
dissolved all the structures of the UMT Rabat, expelled the leftist union leader Abdellah 
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Lefnatsa and appointed a ‘provisional committee’ to run the regional union. On 22 March 
2012, the three leftist NEC members (Abdelhamid Amin, Abderrazak Drissi and Khadija 
Ghamiri) were expelled in turn. In the following weeks, the UMT NEC attempted to 
dissolve the executive committees of the national sectorial federations controlled by the 
left. This is how an UMT militant interpreted these moves: 
 
The regime had started to see the importance of the left within the labour movement, the 
unions. ... Especially for what concerns the important role played by the UGTT in Tunisia. 
This has pressured the Moroccan state to take hard and sharp decisions regarding the UMT 
left. (Rabat, 14 March 2016)  
 
It took years for a new compromise to be found between the UMT left and its leadership, 
but the overall result was a renewed weakening of internal democracy within the 
country’s largest union. This somewhat reflected the situation of the country, as the 
regime moved to limit several of the concessions delivered in 2011. 
 
Tunisia: Trade union polarisation and democratisation via insurrection  
In the 2000s, rising strikes accompanied increasing signs of tension in Tunisia as well as 
within the UGTT. The mounting social opposition against Ben Ali’s regime emboldened 
the UGTT left to demand further internal democratisation, while SG Jerad and his 
associates attempted to maintain the compromise between the confederation and the 
authorities. At the 2006 Congress, after a major controversy, oppositional unionists 
managed to halt the NEC’s attempts to abrogate the two-term limit on presence in the 
NEC, mandated by Article 10 of the internal regulation. In the following years, Jerad and 
his Secretary of Discipline Ali Romdhane rolled back the trade union secondment and 
froze the membership of several dissident cadres.  
In this tense context, the Gafsa Revolt broke out on 5 January 2008 (Allal, 2010). The 
	   24 
mobilisation started as an informal protest by the precarious youth for secure employment 
and local development, with striking similarities to Morocco’s Sidi Ifni movement (Allal 
and Bennafla, 2011). In the village of Redeyef, public administration UGTT militants led 
by Adnen Hajji set up a negotiating committee to support the precarious youth’s 
demands. They were thus able to turn the protest into a protracted social movement. The 
opposition between the politicised UGTT militants and the Gafsa UGTT regional 
executive committee was at the fore, and, on 19 February 2008, the latter froze Hajji’s 
UGTT membership.  
The ‘witch-hunt’ within the UGTT and the events of Gafsa prompted the dissident trade 
unionists to step up their efforts for internal democracy. This resulted in the establishment 
of an internal UGTT current called Rencontre Syndical Démocratique Militant (RSDM), 
aiming to coordinate all the progressive dissident tendencies within the confederation. 
Two leaders of the RSDM explained to the author: 
 
[The RSDM] was a leftist group that wanted to make internal democracy in the UGTT. As 
we always say that the UGTT is the engine of the country, we wanted to limit the mandates 
of the UGTT’s leader in order to do the same with the country as a whole.8 (Tunis, 10 
December 2015) 
 
For the first time the internal opposition jointly organised and acted as such. Because the 
opposition had always been there, but before each group tended to act alone. (Tunis, 2 
November 2015)  
SG Jerad and the RSDM were thus squaring off in view of the next Congress, when the 
unforeseen happened. The Tunisian Uprising started on 17 December 2010 in the 
marginalised region of Sidi Bouzid, with the self-immolation of the street vendor 
Mohamed Bouazizi and the ensuing clashes between the police and mostly precarious 
youths demanding employment and local development (see Hmed, 2012). It was the 
RSDM spokesperson in Sidi Bouzid, Atia Athmouni, along with other public 
	   25 
administration unionists, that coordinated with the protesters to launch a local committee 
to support the mobilisations. As Hèla Yousfi pointed out, the politicised UGTT militants 
contributed to the Uprising in three main ways: the politicisation of the ‘spontaneous’ 
movement, the coordination with the other organised actors, and the mediation with the 
political and trade union authorities (Yousfi, 2015: 65). Another crucial task was using 
the UGTT’s infrastructure to spread the movement geographically and reduce police 
pressure on the mobilised cities. A primary school teacher from Gafsa brought his own 
example: 
 
I had been in touch with the comrades in Tunis, Sfax, Kasserine. Yeah, on the phone. ... 
[An UGTT militant from Kasserine] got mad at me and said: ‘Do something in Gafsa or 
don’t ever call me again!’ So on 11 January we decided to march from the UGTT premises 
that were already encircled by the police, we were just about 20 people. ... On the way 
back, we [and the police surrounding us] bumped into the kids coming out from school, and 
the whole thing kicked off and continued for days. (Gafsa, 22 October 2015)  
 
The RSDM called for a solidarity demonstration in front of the UGTT headquarters in 
Tunis on 25 December 2010. It was the first relatively large protest in the capital and was 
stormed by the police. Five UGTT sectorial federations then called for a new 
demonstration for 27 December 2010, which was also repressed. The slogans of the two 
demonstrations were explicitly against the regime, one of the reasons why SG Jerad 
publicly disavowed them. The UGTT NEC had in fact proved willing to mediate for the 
liberation of the arrested protesters, but, at the same time, it attempted to contain the 
forms of unrest that posed a serious threat to stability by resorting to (unarmed) violence 
or by using political slogans.  
On 8 January 2011, the police fired live bullets on unarmed protesters. The killings 
created widespread public outrage and disorder, which gave the opportunity to the UGTT 
militants to step up their pressure on the union’s mid-level and peak structures. On 11 
January 2011, the UGTT National Administrative Commission authorised regional 
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general strikes to support the demands of the protesters. The general strike in the 
industrialised region of Sfax came on 12 January 2011. The demonstration gathered tens 
of thousands of protesters, and it is recognised as the turning point of the Uprising 
because it was the first massive mobilisation outside of the marginalised regions. On 13 
January 2011, there was the general strike in the Sidi Bouzid region. On 14 January 2011, 
the general strike of Greater Tunis took place. It was meant to be a mere two-hour 
stoppage, but it turned into a large demonstration with clashes in the vicinity of the 
Interior Ministry. In the late afternoon of the same day, while the demonstration was 
ongoing, Ben Ali fled to Saudi Arabia.  
The UGTT, as the largest civil society organisation in the country, was central in the 
negotiations over the new political system. In the months following Ben Ali’s departure, 
protests continued throughout the country while a massive strike wave began. On 11 
February 2011, the National Council for the Protection of the Revolution (NCPR) was 
created, with the participation of the UGTT, to give a more formal representation of the 
revolutionary movement vis-a-vis the government. In March, the NCPR agreed to 
dissolve in favour of the Higher Committee for the Realisation of the Objectives of the 
Revolution, which substituted the disbanded parliament.  
This negotiated process led to the country’s first free and fair election, won by the 
Islamist party Ennahda on 23 October 2011. Soon, hostilities broke out between Ennahda 
and the UGTT. In fact, many UGTT members, under the new leadership of SG Houcine 
Abbassi, perceived the whole organisation as being under the threat of a conservative and 
anti-union government. Ennahda, for its part, accused the UGTT of encouraging strikes 
for ‘political reasons’, that is to overthrow the government. While the strikes were 
genuine attempts by the workers to seize the occasion to improve their livelihoods, the 
UGTT certainly used them to increase its bargaining power in the political negotiations.  
In February 2012, the UGTT headquarters were attacked by pro-government 
demonstrators. The subsequent assassinations by Islamist terrorists of the leftist political 
leaders Chokri Belaïd and Mohamed Brahmi precipitated a political crisis. In this context, 
the UGTT emerged as the leading actor of the ‘Quartet’ (including also the main 
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employers’ association, the Tunisian League of Human Rights and the Bar Association) 
that brokered the National Dialogue between the government and the opposition. As a 
result, in January 2014, a new constitution was approved, the Ennahda-led executive 
resigned in favour of a ‘technocratic’ government, and the date for the new elections was 
set. After the elections, a government led by Nidaa Tounes (mostly a continuation of the 
old Destourian Party) and including Ennahda was sworn in. This ‘grand coalition’ 
appears to have stabilised, at least temporarily, the democratic transition.  
The Tunisian Uprising confronts us with the paradox of the importance of trade unionism 
in concomitance with the relatively marginal role of industrial workers. The real 
protagonist of the Uprising was the precarious youth. As we have seen, Tunisian workers, 
even the unwaged ones, have more structural resources than their Moroccan counterparts 
(e.g. education), which contributes to explaining more sustained mobilisations. In the 
marginalised regions where the Uprising started, industrial employment is almost 
irrelevant. It is the public administration unions that gave the UGTT a capillary network 
in all the areas of the country. However, one should not discount the role of factory 
workers in Tunisia’s industrial centres. With the regional strikes in industrialised Sfax 
and Greater Tunis, the industrial estates mostly stood still and empty, causing great 
economic damage, while demonstrators asking for the departure of Ben Ali flooded the 
city centres. The union militants were thus able to use the UGTT’s associational power to 
create a juncture between precarious and relatively secure workers, despite the NEC’s 
compromising line. 
 
Conclusion  
This article has shown how different levels of working-class power were historically 
constructed through divergent trajectories of social struggles in Morocco and Tunisia. It 
has argued that, on the eve of the 2011 Arab Uprisings, working-class power was higher 
in Tunisia than in Morocco and that this facilitated a more significant role of Tunisia’s 
trade unions in democratic struggles.  
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Overall working-class power in Tunisia was higher in both its structural and associational 
dimensions. Higher levels of ‘human development’ and welfare provisions (e.g. 
education) constituted more resources for the mobilisation of non-unionised precarious 
workers in the marginalised regions. The larger size of industry, of the public sector and 
of the share of workers enjoying relative job security allowed the secure workers to 
mobilise effectively in solidarity with the precarious. In order for this to actually happen, 
the initiative of activists on the ground was crucial in building pressure on the UGTT top 
leadership, so that the union’s associational power could be used to bring into existence 
solidarity between different working-class factions.  
Conversely, in Morocco, relatively low structural working-class power endowed the 
Moroccan precarious workers with fewer resources to mobilise, while the secure workers 
constituted a more limited share of the population. The lower radicality of the protests 
meant that the Moroccan trade unions faced weaker pressures towards radical action, 
which contributed to the compromising line held by the majority of their leaders in spite 
of the efforts towards the opposite direction by many activists. Moreover, the 
associational weakness of the unions facilitated the regime strategy of fragmenting and 
depoliticising social protest along sectorial demands that could be managed within the 
system in place.  
These findings are in line with the claims of authors identifying Tunisia as the Arab 
country featuring the highest level of working-class power and reinforce the broader 
theory according to which working-class power usually facilitates democracy. However, 
they do not exclude future democratisation in Morocco. In fact, working-class power in 
Morocco appears to be higher than in most other Arab countries and could increase 
significantly relative to its levels of 2011. Additionally, working-class power is only one 
among several factors that can facilitate democratisation.  
These conclusions do not idealise Tunisia as a workers’ paradise; very far from it. 
Tunisian workers’ power is high relative to the standards of a staunchly labour-repressive 
region. Moreover, since democratisation, Tunisian workers have faced rising 
unemployment, stagnating real wages and declining standards of living. The UGTT’s 
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political incorporation in the new order has failed to deliver on social justice, putting the 
union in a difficult position especially vis-a-vis the precarious factions of the working 
class, whose mobilisations have continued, including the latest wave of unrest in January 
2018. The inability of the Tunisian democracy to address the grievances of most citizens 
poses a serious legitimacy problem for democracy in the region as a whole. The social 
struggles of the future will tell whether these dilemmas will be resolved through more 
democracy or a full-scale return of authoritarianism. 
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Notes  
1. See also Feltrin (2018) and Meddeb (2011) for an analysis of Tunisian precarious workers.   
2. The USFP originated, through the Union Nationale des Forces Populaires (UNFP), from the  left of the 
Istiqlal Party.   
3. Nazih Ayubi’s classic approach sees Middle Eastern populism as a ‘coalition between the  urban popular 
classes and a predominantly middle-class leadership that is intent on changing  the status quo’ 
(Ayubi, 1995: 206).   
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4. Translated from French by the author.   
5. Based on Ben Romdhane (2011), 57% of the UGTT’s budget in 2005 came from membership  fees; 51% 
represented dues from public sector employees (who are charged more than private sector 
workers), collected by the state through a direct check-off system. The state could and did suspend 
this system in times of crisis. But most militant trade unionists were to be found in the public 
sector, and they did use their membership to pressure the UGTT NEC.   
6. The Union Nationale du Travail au Maroc (UNTM) is the labour confederation linked to the Islamist 
Parti de la Justice et du Développement (PJD).   
7. The interviews were conducted in French. All the quoted excerpts were translated into English by the 
author.   
8. According to the Tunisian Constitution of the time, presidential candidates could not be older than 75. 
As Ben Ali had turned 74 in 2010, he was trying to amend it in order to run for a new mandate.   
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